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Executive summary
This special report is the result of a collaboration 
between academics and practitioners.  It aims 
to assess and identify organisational mitigation 
strategies to respond to space weather events and 
any associated technological disruptions. The format 
aims to provide an overview in order to facilitate 
reading in conditions of limited time availability. The 
following topics are addressed:
• An introduction to severe space weather events 
and their possible impacts. 
• A risk assessment process and discussion 
of vulnerabilities that are common with other 
threats. 
• Illustrative examples.
• An operational checklist for continuity planning 
and management. 
• Basic actions to increase organisational and 
operational resilience.
• Resources for training and essential references. 
What is severe space weather?
Space Weather is a catchall term used to describe 
conditions in the space environment around the 
Earth. Space weather is driven by the activity of the 
Sun such as explosions known as solar flares (that 
release UV and X-ray radiation into the Solar System) 
and eruptions known as coronal mass ejections 
(CMEs, that release magnetic field and hot gas, also 
known as plasma, into the Solar System).
As well as these dramatic and rapid dynamic 
events, the Sun is also the source of a continual 
but highly variable outflow of plasma. These flows 
are collectively called the solar wind. The speed, 
pressure and magnetic field of the solar wind can 
change rapidly depending on solar activity.
The Earth and its magnetic field respond to the 
prevailing conditions. Although the magnetic field 
can protect the Earth by deflecting incoming solar 
wind and CMEs it can also exacerbate hazardous 
conditions by trapping radiation and creating electric 
currents in the atmosphere, the ground and in our 
technological infrastructure. When the Earth’s 
magnetic field is highly disturbed a ‘geomagnetic 
storm’ ensues, during which time the aurora expands 
from inside the arctic circles to lower latitudes, 
radiation levels in the regions where satellites orbit 
become highly variable, and electrical currents 
travelling through the upper atmosphere and on the 
ground increase suddenly in localised areas.
 
Just as with terrestrial weather, periods of severe 
conditions can be experienced. Severe space 
weather can be considered as comprising large 
solar flares, fast coronal mass ejections, and large 
geomagnetic storms that produce levels of radiation, 
UV light and X-rays high enough to pose a risk to 
modern technology, services, and even life in very 
severe cases. The Sun has an activity cycle that 
waxes and wanes roughly every eleven years but 
severe space weather can occur at any point in this 
cycle.
Severe space weather is unique among natural 
hazards, in that its impact can be experienced 
simultaneously around the globe. The three primary 
hazards posed by severe space weather are: 
1. X-rays and other radiation emitted by solar flares 
hits the atmosphere on the side of the Earth facing 
the Sun (in daylight) changing the ionosphere, 
disrupting radio signals and communication 
between satellites and the ground. 
2. Radiation storms caused by CMEs and 
geomagnetic storms increase the dose of particle 
radiation absorbed by satellites, disorienting 
automatic pointing systems, disrupting on-board 
computers and causing electrostatic discharges 
that may damage electronic components. 
 
3. Geomagnetic storms create additional electrical 
currents in the atmosphere that in turn create 
currents at ground level. These currents flow 
through technological infrastructure such as 
high-voltage power lines, pipes, and railway 
infrastructure, causing the tripping of safety 
features, which can lead to disruption of service 
and even unintended damage.
A more detailed introduction to space weather and 
its impacts can be found in reports issued by UCL, 
The Royal Academy of Engineering, Lloyds, and the 
European Commission. See the ‘Further Reading’ 
section at the end of this document. 
Possible impacts
The impacts of space weather can be categorised 
into three main types depending on their cause:
1. Blocking of radio signals (both ground-based 
and satellite). 
2. Radiation dose increase to satellites and 
aircraft. 
3. Generation of electrical currents in conducting 
materials.
Thus, the expected direct impact of severe space 
weather is based around disruptions to technological 
systems:
 
• Communications (HF radio and satellite services).
• Transport (especially Aviation).
• Mapping and timing (GNSS).
• Power (electrical disruption).
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The UK Space Weather Preparedness Strategy 
defines a reasonable worst-case scenario for the 
UK as having a 1% probability in any given year with 
likely impacts being:
• Localised power outages; 
• Disruption of satellite operations, including to 
Global Navigation Satellite System outages 
(GNSS) and SATCOM disturbances; 
• Disruption to high frequency radio 
communications; 
• Increased radiation to aircrew and passengers 
in flight, particularly over polar regions; and 
• Further disturbances to micro-electronic 
systems. 
Power outages would be likely to last only a few 
hours to a day and are more likely at the end points 
of the distribution system. All of these effects may 
occur during intervals lasting anywhere from hours 
up to two weeks.
The rapid pace of technological change, the uptake 
of new technology into essential services and the 
often hidden dependency on systems such as GNSS 
makes assessing the impact of severe space weather 
particularly difficult. In particular, the interconnected 
and inter-reliant nature of modern technology makes 
‘cascading disasters’ possible. This is where one 
or more triggers is able to cause multiple different 
impacts, the effects of which travel through the 
interconnected systems that we have created to 
cause multiple different, and separate, disasters.
Severe space weather events can cause cascading 
effects through our connected technological 
infrastructure. For example, power distribution, 
satellite navigation, and telecommunications systems 
are all routinely used by most UK citizens and 
businesses on a daily basis. Therefore, disruptions 
in these areas could have far-reaching implications. 
The possible consequences of disruptions of 
significant magnitude include the creation and 
escalation of secondary emergencies, challenging 
the coordination of emergency relief and long-term 
recovery. 
Do we have to prepare for severe 
space weather?
Estimates of the probability of severe space 
weather events puts the likelihood of both a severe 
radiation event that could disrupt satellite services 
and geomagnetic storm that can disrupt electricity 
supply at about one in twenty years. Radio 
communication blackouts are slightly more common, 
with radio disruption and satellite communications 
disruptions happening about one in every ten years. 
The reasonable worst-case scenario, which is 
large enough to cause complex and compounding 
disruptions, may be as frequent as one in two 
hundred years. 
In the reasonable worst-case scenario, it is thought 
that power outages would be localised and short, 
however other impacts of space weather can occur 
around the globe and last for several days. Different 
impacts are likely to occur simultaneously with each 
other, and potentially with other hazards.
  
To help prepare for severe space weather, the UK 
government created the Met Office Space Weather 
Operations Centre in 2014, which provides a 24/7 
space weather forecast.
Assessing cascading technological risk
There are many different aspects that determine 
societal resilience as a whole (Florin and Linkov 
2016). Dependency on technology is a critical 
challenge to address in the near future because it 
orients how emergency management teams plan 
for, and respond to, possible crises.  For example, 
as technology becomes more reliable, we become 
dependant on it, possibly to an extent that we do not 
plan for its failure.
 
It is clear that in recent decades the use of tools 
such laptops and GNSS services has changed 
considerably, creating new organisational processes 
and common routines that are rooted in the availability 
of interconnected services.  For example, use of the 
Internet and smartphones has modified both working 
behaviours and management procedures. They are 
reliant on faster, networked, communications and 
data sharing methods that are completely different 
to those available even just a decade ago. Similarly, 
during mass emergencies social media now has a 
prominent role in the dissemination of information, 
and navigation systems become essential for the 
effective deployment of first responders, such as 
ambulances. A new challenge is emerging that relates 
to cloud working, as organisations outsource the 
backing up of information so that they can dispense 
with expensive servers.
When assessing risk, critical infrastructure (CI) 
must be considered as a source of major disruption 
that could inhibit communities’ and organisation’s 
capacity to cope. In other words, disasters 
nowadays may not only be associated with clear 
“life threatening’’ events such as fires or floods. They 
can also be associated with disruptions to critical 
services and technology. Hence, CI can be viewed as 
the physical structures, facilities, networks and other 
assets which provide services that are essential to 
the social and economic functioning of a community 
or society” (UNISDR Glossary 2017).
  
The failure of CI can create cascading effects if 
complex, non-linear sequences of events evolve. This 
can escalate the impact of the primary emergency 
(Pescaroli and Alexander 2015, 2016). In practical 
terms, cascades may not just be associated with the 
magnitude of a severe space weather event: instead, 
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they are rooted in the vulnerabilities that have not 
been addressed in the socio-organisational domains, 
such as the management capacity (see Pescaroli 
and Alexander, 2016). For example, an inadequate 
understanding of early warning systems or the 
absence of a well-designed checklist that should be 
undertaken in the advent of a geomagnetic storm. It 
is key to get the right procedures in place.
 
Impact pathways can be understood and assessed 
through scenario building (Pescaroli and Alexander, 
2016). Many of the potential vulnerabilities and 
sources of escalation that affect the same CI can 
have common triggers. For example, different triggers 
such as severe space weather or cybersecurity can 
have the same process of escalation that leads to 
GNSS failures  (Pescaroli et al., 2018). It is possible 
then to develop space weather scenarios using 
existing material.
However, tools should be grounded in the specifics 
of the regions considered in the planning process. 
For example, remote industries that are highly 
dependent on positioning data versus urban areas 
with the capability to have back-up systems in 
place. One of the challenges in developing these 
scenarios is to be aware of CI interdependencies 
associated with a lack of information sharing among 
stakeholders. London Resilience created a generic 
and replicable model called ANYTOWN to support 
this process (Hogan, 2013).
A checklist for continuity management
The following table proposes a quick assessment 
list that could help to improve business continuity 
management for severe space weather events and 
technological disruptions. It has been derived using 
the format proposed by London Resilience, integrated 
with the resources proposed in the references. The list 
has been cross-checked in an operational workshop 
with non-academic stakeholders. Please note that 
the list does not intend to be exhaustive, but focuses 
on key generic actions that could help maintain an 
organisational and operational lifeline in case of 
technology disruption. An in-depth assessment 
undertaken at a tactical and strategic level may be 
beneficial.
Please note that an operational focus on the cascading 
effects of GNSS failures has been included in our 
complementary report Cascading Impacts of Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems Failures, Pescaroli et al. (2019)
Recommendations for improving 
resilience to severe space weather 
It is possible to define some basic steps that could 
improve organisational resilience to severe space 
weather and to technological failures at large. They 
are:
 - Undertake a review of your critical and core 
processes and procedures to understand the 
impact on the organisation of a space weather 
event.
 - Command and control, ensure key decision 
makers and tactical responders have been 
briefed and the understand procedures to follow 
in the event of a space weather event. 
 - Ensure notification and activation procedures 
are not reliant on technology that may be 
impacted by a space weather event. 
 - Define an operational procedure to be activated 
in case of telecommunication failure and/or 
blackout, such as defining a meeting point and 
key actions to be addressed.
 - Ensure that key personnel have instructions of 
what to do in case of public transport disruption.
 - Exercise scenarios of technological disruptions 
with your colleagues to define what vital 
procedures could be compromised and which 
are resilient.
 - Maintain a safe (not VOIP) landline for assuring 
vital telecommunication.
 - Create a paper-based vault of key documents 
and procedures.
 - Define energy conservation procedures to 
undertake in case of an emergency.
 - Procure a minimum amount of multifunctional 
emergency hand crank radios and chargers.
 - Keep extra batteries available and safe.
 - In case of a warning of severe electrical 
disruption, verify if it’s recommended to 
disconnect electrical appliances. 
 - Overall, review and update your business 
continuity plan. Assess the needs and the 
actions already undertaken in your organisation.
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General assessment for technological failures
Do you have a Business continuity plan? Is it regularly reviewed and updated?
List your critical services/departments and the technology they are reliant on
What technological systems are likely to cause knock-on effects or affect multiple users or departments if disrupted?
What are the knock-on effects of technological failures in your business? At what point will your business 
continuity arrangements be activated?
0 – 12 hours loss:
12 – 24 hours loss:
24 – 48 hours loss:
48 hours to 1 week loss:
Have you assessed the capacity of your organisation to remain operational during an extended technological failure? 
How do you communicate with your colleagues or employees in case of loss of telecommunications? 
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Do you have HR procedures or polices in place to address technological failure, that is, if you have home-
workers or lone workers are they aware of the processes to be enacted in the event of a technological 
failure?
Are your key personnel aware of what to do in case of loss of telecommunication? (e.g. meeting points)
Are your backup systems available, maintained and operational? (Including generators)
What are the supply lifelines your organisation cannot afford to lose in a worst-case scenario?
What measures can be taken to improve each individual’s resilience in case of technological failures?
(e.g. cash, hand crank chargers)
Do you have a paper-based backup of key contacts and documentation? Are they the most update ver-
sions and is there a process in place to replace them as documents get revised?
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Severe space weather events (SSW)
Is your organisation aware of the likelihood of SSW and its possible impacts?
Do you know how to receive and react to a warning of an SSW? For example, have you signed up for 
space weather information from the Met Office Space Weather Operations Centre?
Have you ever exercised a scenario of an SSW?
What are the key uncertainties that you could face in case of SSW and how will you tackle them?
What are the key actions needed to protect your equipment from SSW?
Do you have energy conservation procedures that could be activated in case of SSW?
Do you have an emergency generator? Is it operational and have personnel been trained to use it?  Does it 
cover all critical systems or locations?
How is your organisation dependent on GNSS?
What consequences will your business suffer during a GNSS disruption?
How can you mitigate GNSS disruption to your business?
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Essential references and further reading
 
The following list summarises the open access literature that has been considered for this report.
For further details, please contact the authors for more detail.
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UCL’s Department of Space and Climate Physics, (Mullard Space Science Laboratory - MSSL), 
is a world-leading research organisation and is the UK’s largest university-based space research 
group. MSSL delivers a broad, cutting-edge science programme, underpinned by a strong 
capability in space science instrumentation, space-domain engineering, space medicine, systems 
engineering and project management. 
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Our mission is to promote a cross-disciplinary approach to the emerging topic of cascading risk, 
involving the public sector, private enterprises and communities in impact-oriented collaborations.
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The IRDR aims to bring together the expertise available at University College London in terms of 
research, teaching and knowledge exchange to overcome the barriers to understanding risk and 
reducing the impact of disasters.
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